报告题目：Supplier Competition Under Capacity Reservation

主讲人：邵鲁生教授（澳大利亚墨尔本大学）

时间：2024年4月3日（周三）10:00 a.m.

地点：北院卓远楼305会议室

主办单位：统计与数学学院

摘要：In this talk, I will discuss two game theoretical models about capacity reservation. The general problem we consider involves a buyer first reserving capacity from multiple suppliers and then using the capacity to generate revenue. The suppliers compete by offering a two-dimensional price (i.e., reservation price and execution price), and our focus is on understanding the suppliers’ bidding behaviors in this setting. The first model considers a discrete version of the problem in which the suppliers each owning a block of capacity determine two scalar prices, and the buyer is restricted to reserve the whole block or nothing. The second model considers a continuous version of the problem in which the suppliers bid in the form of supply functions and the buyer can reserve any amount of capacity. We characterize Nash equilibria for the suppliers and study the properties of the equilibria.

主讲人简介：

邵鲁生，墨尔本大学商业与经济学院，运营与供应链管理教授。他的研究兴趣包括供应链竞争、合同和激励措施，以及可持续运营。邵教授的研究成果发表于Operations Research、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences等主流期刊。他目前是Decision Sciences的副主编和Production and Operations Management的编委会成员。